

The Structure of Change: An Introduction

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Permanently temporary war

We live in a global state of war. We don't live in sequential spaces of local wars and conflicts. War and conflict are no longer local. They are no longer states of exception. Rather, their state is indeterminate and hard to piece together. War is everywhere and nowhere. It does not confine or try to isolate itself. Rather, it wants to obliterate all borders and fences. It wants to see human bodies spread out on the same plane, for them to be at its direct disposal, sometimes cutting down their possibilities of movement, sometimes opening them up. In the end, its aim is to give direction to movement, to find for it a function and to identify its origin. It aims to give coordinates to movement.

In this permanent state of war, a new kind of system of control is spreading around the globe. War is the permanent and principal mode of being of this system, even if its explicit military, political, social, legal operations vary. In this war, we may distinguish two frontlines or lines of force through which we may begin to understand it. These lines are interlaced together; they are weaving a new form of power.

The first of these lines is external. In the external war we may still see the formal (nation) states, even if the condition of the independent states and their ability to guarantee the safety of their citizens is continuously weakening. The loss of this capability to maintain the safety of their citizens means the beginning of war, a constitutive war, a war which is shaping the coming forms of life. Therefore, if we wish to create a new safety, a new justice, we cannot start from the existing institutions of the state, not from human dignity, respect for others and other such categories, but we must start from the state of lawlessness, the state of statelessness, the state of anomy, from the state of those who don't have a state and who may thus create something new.

This external war is being waged to control the movements of human masses and populations. At its root it is a biopolitical conflict in which the brutal practices of World War II (camps, genocides, torture) are being re-enacted solely as humanitarian tragedies without any moral or political rage. This war is not external because it would then be directed outside the so-called western world. It equally penetrates human bodies in the west, by organizing and disciplining their powers and powerlessness. It is external because it is directed at the human body, which in this war is absolutely without any

protection from the law, because it is the mere powerless object of manoeuvres, as the desperate actions of suicide bombers tell us.

The second front line is internal. It is the line of development of the new system of control and the corresponding form of power, which departs radically from the state model. This war does not aim to control human bodies in space. It is being waged to control the possibilities of human action, to control the human intellect and communication, to control the movement of minds. It operates with what we can do, say and think. This new *power over the life of the mind*, that is, power over the use of brains, language and communication is not only 'western', even if it is characterized by transformations in social and political relations in western countries. These changes may be characterized as a transformation towards societies of control.

The emerging societies of control are being legitimated by a particular fundamentalist and extreme rightwing ethos. This fundamentalism does not express itself as open racism, even if it talks about the clash of civilizations. It does not express itself as open racism, as the priority of the 'Aryan race' or as apartheid. It does not focus on people's external features and properties, but on what they think, on what they believe, and on what they might do. It expresses itself in the spread of suspicion and distrust, and in the tacit models of behaviour organization of strict, and thinking. In such example, a 'terrorist' differs by definition from a 'Jew'. Whoever behaves 'abnormally', rebels or simply acts suspiciously in relation to the behaviour required for 'state safety' – for example, in defending elementary civil rights – can be perceived as at least a potential terrorist, and he or she must therefore be eliminated and disarmed, even before he or she has done anything. In other words, his or her *possibilities* for action must be controlled. This control of possibilities above all means control of thought and movement. We are on our way to the religious state where the difference between thought and action has disappeared.



The separation between thinking (belief; religion) and action (the state) formed the two supporting pillars of the modern democracies, which have collapsed in the age of the war against terrorism, as control focuses not so much on actual actions in space, but on the possibilities for thinking and acting in time. The ease with which the so-called western states are moving back to the principle of *cuius region eius religio* ('whose the region is, his religion') that dates back 400 years, is astounding. As Prime Minister Blair said after the attacks in London: "Our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people." And President Bush added: "The attack in London was an attack on the civilized world. And the civilized world is united in its resolve: We will not yield. We will defend our freedom." The destruction of the state governed by law takes place as a kind a mass psychosis, in which it is thought that punishment for thinking only concerns others, and that there are two different laws, one for 'us' and one for 'others'. But when the central principles of constitutional states collapse, they collapse for everybody and not just for Muslims, for immigrants, and for 'others' in general.

This displacement within modern societies – and the transformation towards a ‘fundamentalist’ religious state – is not as much as it seems a reaction to an external state of affairs. Rather, it is a reaction to the *internal* development of societies, especially to the birth of the new social subject (the ‘brain worker’), but with the methods and models of the old (industrial) society. This is so at least insofar as we consider the changes in the world of economics and production. The ayatollahs are much closer than Iran.



Movement without cause is the origin of restlessness and unrest. It compels power to move, outside of its castles. When movement has many directions and possible meanings, when we don't know where we are and where we are going, we have to start to grope about, to touch, to experiment. Now, we are fleeing in every direction, escaping far from equilibrium and harmony. People are set in motion, flow and spread without the limitations of direction, origin and meaning. Only such setting in motion, flowing and spreading unleashes movement and desire. Or, thinking can advance, move and touch only when it takes meaning to the point of collapse, far beyond society and its requirements.

As Heraclitus said, war makes some slaves, and others free. In the war against intellect, we have no positive chance of freedom through rebuilding the independent castles of thinking and politics. Only a desire to create our own problems opens up the possibility of an experiment that would define anew the relations between thinking and acting, art and science, and through that the new forms of political and social action. Society and history are never experimental; they are just a set of more or less negative preconditions, which make it possible to experiment with something beyond history. Beyond history, that is where *Capturing the Moving Mind* is aiming. It was held not so much to interpret the present war, its reasons and objectives, but to experiment and experience something that goes beyond the regime of war, to experiment and experience possible new forms of action, production and politics.

Capturing

Gilles Deleuze writes in his great article ‘Postscript on control societies’ about the transformation that takes place from the temporal and spatial succession that characterizes (industrial) disciplinary societies to control societies, which instead of enclosing in a space and organizing temporal successions, operate through continuous modulation of time and space.

The institutional models of enclosure found in disciplinary societies, with the discipline being exercised on the human body and spirit, and the particular knowledges (e.g. psychiatric knowledge) that arose in them, may be understood as the invention of the *factory*. In a factory immaterial labour and manual labour, planning and execution, communication and production were separate and had their own spaces.

What does a factory actually do? Above all, it constitutes a stage that gives spatial unity and coherence to time, place and action.

What characterized a factory was a *unity of space*. In certain places certain actions were carried out, and different places were connected in a coordinated way. Specialization penetrated not only into factories, but also into schools, homes, hospitals. The workplace was a kind of mould which made the worker interiorize the norms of the economy as movements of his body. Each particular place, each link in the chain had beside it a watching space, which checked that in each place what was supposed to be performed was performed, and that time was not wasted on anything irrelevant. This spatial unity also gave rise to its own forms of resistance: booze hidden in the machine; extended coffee breaks; 'illegal' communication among workers; gravitation to the blind spots of control; etc.

What ruled in the factory was *temporal unity*. The workers were present at the same time. What was important were timetables; externally determined tasks were to be carried out at externally determined times: task one, task two, lunch break, rest etc. Timetables were means of discipline, by which tasks were divided up and time was divided off and gradually sold. The productivity of bodies and their movements was scheduled, like being enclosed in a kind of time mould.



What governed the factory was the consistency and *unity of action*. Particular actions were dependent on each other and managed one by one. An organization chart coordinated it all.

The model based on the unity of time, space and action has been in crisis since the 1970's. This crisis is about the general crisis of the disciplinary society and its institutions (factory, prison, hospital, school, family). The breakdown of the traditional nuclear family, along with the emotions, norms and models of behaviour that were Taylorized in it, has perhaps been the most convincing expression of this crisis. The breakdown of the nuclear family also forces changes in upbringing, education and the labour market.

The collapse of the model of the disciplinary society has meant a passage from command to communication, from receiving orders to participation and interaction by those ordered about, from the prison to controlled movement on the highways (of knowledge), from the execution of set tasks to surfing the net, from an assertive handshake to noncommittal cuddling. The walls of the closed institutions fall and indeterminacy, confusion and disorder penetrate into the spaces of factory and family where continually different 'workstations' begin to form. We move from a closed, immobile and concrete factory to an open, moving, abstract enterprise. The enterprise is in continuous transformation and redefinition without stability, just as the work at the enterprise is changing and precarious. It is not so much a matter of flexibility or

adaptation, but of *modulation* and *variation*. As Deleuze understood, we are moving from the rigid mould ('dress code') to self-decomposing compositions, to projects that are put together out of heterogeneous materials.¹

Modulation now concerns space, time and action. The limits of space disappear, they are continuously redefined, spaces vary and even exist inside each other, because of the new means of communication. Working time varies, the time spent on the actual paid work becomes indeterminate and flexible in its limits, while working history too becomes piecemeal. In the sphere of action, the personal and the public (or what belongs to the company) start to commingle, intensities of work and levels of commitment vary continuously, and the worker's commitments make the work schizophrenic, when the abundance of promises and the possibility of keeping them irreversibly part company. And we could add to the list the modulation of the employment system itself and the increase in 'flexible components' in salaries. In short, modulation no longer operates through the unity of space, but rather is *spatially boundless*; it no longer operates through temporal unity, but rather is *temporally endless*; no longer through organizing visible and particular actions, but through action that has become *invisible and discontinuous*.



Behind these forms of modulation there is an essential factor, which might be called the conflict or the change in subjective, personal participation and commitment: we need to be interested in everything without caring for anything. This is a subjective attempt to control modulation so that we will not be left totally at its mercy. It is no surprise that the modulation of this subjective commitment has become the central site of operation for the new control systems, where they try to have an effect on enthusiasm, indifference, motivation, difference, resignations, leaving, beginning anew, and other aspects of the sense of commitment through various means, ranging from therapy and medicalization to crude enforcement. On this site – where everyone is interested in everything, but nobody cares about anything – we are fighting for our freedom, for our 'own time' and for our right to move.

According to Foucault's thesis on the primacy of resistance, if power relations penetrate the whole social field, it is because there is freedom everywhere. That is, in Fordist industrial capitalism and its disciplinary mechanisms (and modern democracies) what remained an area of freedom and resistance was brains, thinking and communication.

1 Modulation is boundless moulding or moulding in a continuously variable way. A modulator is a mould which continuously changes its form, function and settings. If modulation is moulding in a variable and endless way (in indeterminate time-space), moulding is modulation in a fixed and finite way (in determined spacetime). See Deleuze, G. (1990) *Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle in Pourparlers*. Minuit. and 'Anti-Oeptide et Mille plateaux', Cours Vincennes, 27.02.1979.

These are now being penetrated by the new mechanisms of power, which are minimizing the freedom of brains and killing their resistance. That is why we can say: what is going on is a war against intellect.

Mind

Today, we are increasingly working with our brains and feelings. We live in a situation in which the determined spatial and temporal coordinates of work and production are disappearing. Intellect and thinking are central to production. They are also determining the nature of our organizations – we even talk about intellectual organizations, learning organizations – and are crucial to the renewal of our societies: only the intellect seems capable of creating something new by being able to extend beyond what is existent and visible.

As such, the process of thinking has no particular place: you don't see it except through its possible outcomes. It does not have a spatial



specific or through its existence, and



therefore it is impossible to restrict it to a certain space. Thinking may take place anywhere, there is no privileged space for it. It is a movement that does not



show outwardly.



Thinking has no

temporal

for



succession. Its time is not chronological, rather it is jumpy and meandering. Thinking can take place any time, there is no specific privileged time it.



is

add up clear, clean different



Thinking is messy: don't

Warburg, where particular piece which then opens up an entirely what was thought before. In this characterized by a kind of *dyslexia*



consistently, they don't proceed in a order or logic. Rather, they are ruled by a quite principle, as in the famous library of Aby while looking for a of work one finds another, different perspective on sense, thinking is rather than a taxonomy. It

means that thinking is a talent of *sense* and not one of communication. It is a simultaneous use of many senses and not some sort of supremacy of one sense over others. What is important is understanding, moving and changing entities.

What is central in the 'knowledge economy' or 'knowledge society' is brain work, intelligence and its use. This is something that could be described, following Gabriel Tarde, as *cooperation between minds*, or as cooperation, action and movement in brains. This cooperation has no spatial existence, it is not guided by temporal succession and it does not proceed consistently. What is important for cooperation between minds is not an individual genius, a definite subject that has to be located, but the general intellect, the collective intellect. The pinpointing of the subject in a particular body always threatens brain movement. Brain workers do not form a compact social class with a spatial existence. Because of their indeterminacy, mobility and spatial invisibility they are a continuous threat to authorities and pre-existing borders, norms and limitations. Brainwork cannot be reduced to pre-existing knowledge, already codified knowledges, to what we already know and have already said. It takes place before any visible or audible performance in space.



The cooperation between brains is not only the target of control and organization, not just a focus of political operations. Rather, it has become the actual (and invisible) stage of politics, a form of political relationship and the only origin of productivity, the 'place' for creating something new. In this invisible force field, the political struggle and production mix, as when the value of companies is no longer in the fixed capital, in the machines and equipment, patents or software, but in the cooperation between brain workers, in the surrounding society where intellectual action is spread everywhere. In this 'place' the new (needs) are created, the old is recycled into new contexts. It is here that new forms of life are invented. That is why the central issue in politics in this 'place' is the use of life, brains and the entire society: free use of brains, freedom of cooperation between minds and the ability to pose our own problems; or, the use of brains for solving already existing, and already posed problems. It is on this field of political conflict, where the fight for the free use of human minds is being fought out, that the new forms and practices of power emerge. These new practices have very little to do with the methods that were based on the unity of space, time and action. They might be best described as *power over the life of the mind* or *arbitrary power*.

Indeed, from the perspective of the traditional methods of organizing and controlling work, such as wages and fixed capital, cooperation between minds is problematic, because of its spatial, temporal and operational indeterminacy: separating work and non-work, and thinking and the material results of thinking, is difficult, and moreover,

this separation in fact tends to prevent the occurrence of thought (by forcing thinking to achieve a preset result or by preventing the movement and combination of thoughts).

What is controlled is no longer tasks defined for particular spaces, tasks carried out at certain times, or the consistency of the actions performed. The new controls operate in phases and are based on the relationship between objectives and the results. Their simple aim is self-evaluation, self-control and accountability: have I achieved my objectives, have I reached my own level? Or have I once again failed? This continuous accounting and self-evaluation is flexible and pliable. Now the objectives and actions vary. This continuous modulation replaces the inflexibility and direct control in wage work. Self-evaluation returns, thinks back and organizes memory into facts, it turns it into history by giving past events their place and meaning. This remembering is not always a pleasure, as when it is done under the threat of unemployment.

The freedom of flexible, pliable work is controlled freedom. The worker needs to control herself and her commitment to work. Now the fallow times, the coffee breaks and other breaks from work, which previously formed times of resistance and freedom, are monitored by bad conscience and the feeling of 'not doing enough', of not having gone into work enough. What were previously moments of joy and freedom, the joy of not having to work, have suddenly and surprisingly turned into moments of sorrow and deprivation. There is no longer a boss, there are no longer the constraints of physical and spatial hierarchies: the worker must learn to work by herself.



But this is also to say that modulation is never simple, one-way control. It also concretizes the possibility of freedom, the need to get rid of the closed spaces in which all the action and movement (whether physical, intellectual or emotional) is partitioned and suspended. The disciplinary society was characterized by limitation of the movement of bodies, partitioning and concentration of thinking, the contraction of the expression of feeling and of the emotional world.

Through modulation and variation people are trying to take over their own lives and create new experiences, to expand their relationships, and thereby their power and ability to manage in the world. The question is one of the relations of force between freedom (the extent, autonomy and movement of relations) and submission.

It is also necessary to understand that control over the life of the mind does not outright destroy the model of enclosure (even if it reveals its inefficiency). Rather, the two operate side by side, shoulder to shoulder, or within one another. The decisive point, however, is that today these mixtures of controls (as in China, where we find the most feudal organization and the most advanced cyber police in operation simultaneously) avoid committing or attaching themselves to any particular institution and its function, which would set limits and tie and slow things down. Today control has no permanent external reason or foundation, like the law, the norm or a particular task, within which it would function. Rather, it operates without institutional legitimation, or then its logic and foundations seem to change from day to day: it is baseless power, that is, *arbitrary*

power or pure power, power without any permanent relation to law, to a norm, or to any particular task. Its relation to any particular reason, task or meaning is arbitrary.²

The arbitrary nature of control means that, whereas modern power always received its legitimation as a means to a particular end (the factory produces, the hospital treats illness, the state protects the labour force, the army wages war, research is done in a university...), today, power is never simply a means to an end. In other words, the arbitrariness of power cannot be understood by approaching it in relation to the ends that it, as a means, attempts to achieve, but rather its arbitrary nature entails power as *pure power*, power as power without reasons or ends. The analysis of arbitrary power cannot therefore be about identifying a power that is only a justified or non-justified means towards this or that end, but which is in no relation to ends at all, and operates *in some other way* (than as a means to an end).

The arbitrariness of arbitrary power is therefore not a result of some intrinsic character that would distinguish it, for example, from modern power, that is, from means that always have an end, or some institutional context or some particular legitimation (from means that acquire their 'reason' or legitimation from a particular institution and its task), but from its arbitrary relation to these. This is how the concept of arbitrary power opens up the nexus between the floating currency (the floating signifier, the arbitrary sign) and the generic human capacities (intellect, perception, linguistic-relational abilities) as means of production, that is, the nexus between the era when the faith in the sign is lost (our experience of the triviality of all reasons and meanings) and the production of wealth in modalities that cannot be thought or understood via the concepts of modern economics, and always restricted to capital's self-expansion. The 'knowledge economy' is the continuation of capitalism without a foundation, and arbitrary power is its logical form of organization.


Movement, or, the structure of change

In the organizational experiment *Capturing the Moving Mind* everybody was 'alone together', each one taking care of her/himself at the same time participating in the band, sometimes in the centre, again finding her/himself at its edge, like a pack of wolves around a fire with neighbours to the left and to the right, holding on by just a hand or a foot, but with nobody behind them, their backs naked and exposed to the Gobi desert. For the logic of the one and the many did not fit our plans, nor did organizing many different (people) around a common cause, for each different one to be able to express themselves in the best way possible without impeding the others. As we saw it, a common goal, a common ground or common language is not needed as the condition of cooperation. This is the first meaning of the concept *multitudo*: it is not conditioned by a common cause or by determinate meanings. It is not a 'one' constructed out of the 'many', it is not composed of individuals or of a diversity of parts that are glued

2 Or we can put it also like this: 'International legality' (Kuwait 1999), 'humanity' and 'human rights' (Somalia 1999, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999), 'enduring freedom' (Afghanistan 2000), 'war against terrorism' (Iraq 2000).

together. It is absolutely devoid of any external or transcendent common denominator. It does not amount to pluralism. It has nothing to do with tolerance. It finds its community, its unity, in change. It finds its substance in movement.³ In movement relations of cooperation combine, not in terms of a common cause, but in terms of attraction and rejection, in movement good relations are those that add power, extend and combine, and bad ones are those that take apart, isolate and suffocate. The difference between increase in powers and their reduction is not a leap, a transition or a difference in their nature. When we come across something that is right for us, we link to it, combine with it and devour it. What we were before fuses with what we have encountered and becomes part of a bigger, more extensive subjectivity.

In terms of this movement and such subjectivity it is important to understand a few things about our experimental organization. First of all, this organization did not drop from the heavens, but had to be made. It was not made for fun, but out of necessity. The necessity to resist the new war and arbitrary power. The necessity to create our own problems and forms of life, and not only to respond to the questions and 'weekly assignments' already posed by the Teacher-Capital. The necessity not to submit at the moment when the fragility on which the new controls are built (the naked belief and fear) reveals itself; when we should reject panic and fear they try to spread; when we should take control of our lives, and not just react to the demands and requirements placed on us.



Secondly, movement is not born out of nothing. The organizational experiment was made up of around 40 independent projects, 40 body-mind or time-space constellations, a series of 40 pieces whose connections were not pre-destined in any way. Anything could have happened. This was the potentiality in our hands, a potentiality for anything, a potentiality to do anything (also to fail or to give in), a potentiality from which anything can be expected. On the train, it was as if we could look directly into the eye of our existence as potential beings who *do not have any particular surrounding, any particular task or function*, that is, as beings who can do anything and from whom anything may be expected. Ontology revealed itself phenomenologically: we experienced what it means to be a 'human being'. This is the second meaning of the concept *multitudo*: we experience, at the same time, the abundance of our possibilities

3 This means that it must differ, not from something else, but from itself, or in other words, that it is change. The question is no longer of change as a change of something, but of change itself taking on a substantial nature without any need to presuppose something else (like a changing object). To say that *multitudo* is change, is to say that it differs with itself internally: the change itself becomes a unity of substance and subject, a *causa sui*, that is, a substance that is the cause of itself. That is why the multitude does not need anything outside itself, a reason, a cause, a meaning, or any kind of mediation to support and guarantee its existence. This makes it absolute. This is important because, insofar as a cause is external to its effect, it cannot function as a basis of its being, it can only guarantee a possibility of existence, but not its necessity or substantiality. An effect can never have more reality than its cause.

and the trivialness and vanity (arbitrariness, fundamental groundlessness) of all reasons. In such a condition, we have no other ground, no other resources to turn to except ourselves, that is, this very ability to do anything that characterizes us. This experience of the naked 'I can' does not refer to any particular ability or faculty, but to our nature as such. It may be the most severe and cruel experience possible: the experience of potentiality.



Yet this potentiality is always entangled in its expression, as is our journey to its organization, and is in no way separable from it. The journey could also have turned into a chaos or a catastrophe, and remain so. We are animals that are able to change our fate, but are also able not to do so. We can do or can not do, we can succeed or fail, lose ourselves or find ourselves, become slaves or become free. No excuses, our behaviour is not prescribed by a biological vocation, assigned by a necessity, but always retains the character of possibility. Through this potentiality we may face chance events, others, either lose or gain connections, branch off into change. None of this happens by itself, but rather it creates its own 'problem'. To create our own problems is to have the courage to look directly in the eye of our ability to do anything, to climb our way back to it, to touch, not a chaos in which we would disappear, but a movement that gives us consistency.

Finally, then, if it is true that arbitrary power operates on the possibilities of our thinking and acting, which it tries to subordinate to the already structured tasks and aims of a particular historical period (as in capitalist valorization), then the question of movement and the good life – a life in which our ways and our acts of living are always about creating our own problems – interferes directly with the core of this struggle. What is at stake is not just this or that historical fact, or this or that injustice, but the *ability and structure of change as such*.

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