



But What Should We Do?

Pekka Piironen

abstract

This paper outlines the relation between economy and multitude. This relation is expressed in three forms of economy. In the first form of economy multitude appears as measurable. In the second form communication has entered into production. Communication shows that the potentiality of multitude is multiplied possible combinations. In the third form one understands that economy is exposed to multitude. Now multitude isn't measurable. Negri noted that the right point of time (kairos) produces multitude. And Agamben indicated that if one understands that Being and human beings belong together then one would grasp how potentiality is essentially impotentiality. Therefore, multitude is capable of producing the rupture in economy. This determines us to ask what we should do now. Heidegger and Benjamin suggested this, and Agamben repeated it. It wasn't enough for Agamben that he had shown a possible character of means but he wanted to indicate how we can think the essential political problem through Ereignis. Negri also noted that kairos is not enough. It produces the multitude but it doesn't ask what multitude should do or which way human activity takes place. To set up this problem for thinking is the essential political problem, and it is also the problem of the economy in its third form.

Introduction

What is economy today? We can no longer think that economy is something in which direct labour is measured by labour time. Neither is it the production of goods and services which is dominated by the firm's profit and consumer benefit. This form of economy is referred to by Marx as the limited bourgeois form.¹ But furthermore, economy is not production in which all social components are put together through social combination. The social combination means that capital is capable of transposing all social powers into its powers by all the means of arts and science. But these two forms give us only a limited picture of economy.

Marx was one of the first to try to grasp economy in which the limited bourgeois form is stripped away (1973: 488) or which doesn't remain a simple social combination (1973: 690-712). Perhaps he meant an economy in which an immeasurable *multitude* works. This multitude is never definable by some simple facts. It doesn't lose its character of a

1 Marx spoke of the limited bourgeois form of richness. We see the first form of economy as the limited bourgeois form, because multitude is analyzed as measurable.

possibility. What multitude does isn't already done or actualized but it remains its potentiality (Agamben, 2000: 4, 11; Virno, 2004: 21). But multitude is not only that which can do something. That is, if we think multitude as subjectivity we have to ask what produces this subjectivity (Virno, 2004).

Negri (2003: 173) answers that *kairos* produces that subjectivity. *Kairos* is the singular, right point of time, the moment or flash which is interpreted as the event of Being. It is never produced by subjectivity. The idea of this moment is also the basis of *Ereignis*, gift, 'compearance' and mean. Concepts like '*Ereignis*' (Heidegger), 'gift' (Derrida), 'compearance' or 'co-appearance' (Nancy), and 'means' (Agamben) imply that multitude contains impotentiality. And in economy this impotentiality produces the rupture which gives the multitude a reason to work. General intellect, which, according to Agamben (2000: 11), names the multitude, could be something which isn't measurable and from which it is never possible to isolate something like limited bourgeois form or social combination. However, Marx didn't complete his thinking on how economy is exposed to general intellect in that particular sense in which the gift, 'compearance' and means have made this rupture visible. Heidegger (1977a, b)² perceived economy through technology. His most important concept, *Ereignis*, indicates that economy is exposed to Being and its coming to presence which produces the rupture in economy. Contemporary discussion refers to that concept and comments it with different variations.

For Derrida (1997), the gift interrupts the circle of economy. He means that the intentional act is infected by something which leads this act away from its end. This is the event of gift and at this moment Being appears. In this event gift comments *Ereignis*. When *Ereignis* is appropriation and expropriation at the same time, gift gives itself without commitment to appropriation or expropriation. Gift as such cannot be appropriated immediately.

Nancy (1991) also comments on *Ereignis*. He sketches an arrangement in which singular beings as such come together and appear together ('compearance', *comparution* in French). And that what is shared in this community is the non-functioning of its organization, the unworking of work. Here Nancy's motif is to think of Being-with-others. Agamben (2000: 116-117) approaches this subject by potentiality. According to him, means contain potentiality. That is, means prove to be inadequate in the sense that they do not produce simple measurable facts or achievements of an end. Means are not subordinated to an end. Neither political experience has a higher end but this experience is 'being-into-a-mean'. In short, human beings are capable of using means, but at the same time they are capable of their own incapacity to appropriate means fully. I shall return to this later.

If one studies economy, then the gift, 'compearance' and means cannot be neglected. Even if these concepts are related to economy in different ways, they are tied up to the fact that economy is exposed to multitude. Understanding this multitude needs the gift, the 'compearance' and the means to indicate that potentiality of multitude is essentially

2 Heidegger didn't speak much about economy. But if one speaks of economy, he cannot neglect technology.

impotentiality.³ These concepts state the problem of economy correctly like Agamben stated ‘being-into-a-mean’ as the essential political problem.

In this article I firstly study how Marx thought economy and I outline its three forms. Strictly speaking, Marx spoke only about the limited bourgeois form and the last phase of capitalism. I will call the limited bourgeois form the first form of economy. This is the simplest form in which direct labour is measured by labour time. In this form multitude and its work is analyzed as measurable, actualized and done. The second form of economy is the last phase of capitalism which has been the object in the analysis of post-fordist production. This is the stage of ‘social combination’ where all social forces are put to capitalistic production. It is the last phase because that form of production turns against itself. The analysis of post-fordist production has made this stage more visible – it has tried to show why production in the last phase turns against capital itself. And what is crucial in this analysis is communication. Communication is the decisive factor which separates the second form from the first one. In the second form communication has entered into production. Yet the problem of economy is not clear in the second form. Even if the analysis of post-fordist production is perhaps the best description of contemporary economy, it has not been able to make the problem of economy clear. Therefore, we must try to find the place for that problem in the third form.

Social combination means that everything can be set as resource. This is similar to what Heidegger meant when he spoke of technology. For Heidegger, materialism is concealed in technology. In this sense technology is the second form of economy. Therefore after Marx, this *technology* will be considered in brief. But Heidegger suggested that *Ereignis* produces a rupture in technology. As such, *Ereignis* is the bridge to the third form of economy in which we find the actual problem of economy. Like *Ereignis*, the gift, ‘compearance’ and means, all define the problem of economy. If this problem is crucial to economy, then it means that the third form of economy is defined by multitude’s potentiality which is essentially impotentiality. The third form is, in other words, for making this multitude more visible.

Economy

In the simplest form of economy direct labour is measured by labour time. This is called the limited bourgeois form. The second form of economy is conceptualized as social combination. It means that capital is capable of transposing all social powers into powers of itself by all means of art and science.⁴ Then Marx thought about economy in which multitude with creative potentialities works or in which multitude works, a multitude whose creative potentialities are immeasurable (Marx, 1973: 488). This was a kind of preliminary idea of the third form of economy.

3 Agamben (1999a) wrote in his essay that potentiality is essentially impotentiality.

4 Marx described these forms of economy as “The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself” (1973: 705).

Bataille (1988: 19-41) perceived economy as restricted and general. But this way of studying economy is just another way to express what Marx had already said and to experience economy wider than restricted. But general doesn't mean the expansion of capitalism. It implies that economy is in relation to a sort of multitude. So, we need to rethink Marx's (1973: 690-712) understanding about the ultimate development of capitalism and the forms of economy.

The first form of economy is the simplest form. Marx wrote in *Grundrisse* about "fixed capital and the development of the productive forces of society" (1973: 690). In this particular text Marx noted that in capitalistic production capital transforms means of labour to an automatic system of machinery. This system is put "in motion by an automaton, a moving power that moves itself" (*ibid.*, 692). By this transformation capital prevents interruptions in production process. Workers only supervise and guard machines against these interruptions. Therefore, the machine is no longer workers' means of labour, and the worker is no longer the principal factor of production. Instead he is thrown beside the machine. The production process is no longer dependent on workers' direct skilfulness and virtuosity. Labour does not appear any more as the primacy of the labour process. "The tendency of capital is to give production a scientific character" (*ibid.*, 699). This all means that production process is now understood as the technological application of science.

What governs production when labour is thrown beside it? This is the system of machinery. We have hints that labour is not located in a single place. Instead, it is spread over millions of points of this mechanical system. This refers to the composition of the production process which appears as the technological application of science. This composition is moved by communication which proves to be necessary in social combination. If we are to put social work, business, novel writing and portrait painting together in social combination, we have to create relations among them. And they have to communicate by some means or another. But "any communication is first of all communication not of something in common but of communicability itself" (Agamben, 2000: 10). If one follows Nancy, in communication all social forces (or singular beings) are exposed to each other, and this means that "communication is the unworking of work that is social, economic, technical and institutional" (1991: 31).

Labour is spread over numerous points that communicate with each other. When large-scale industry has developed to the point of social combination, then creation of wealth is less dependent on "the labour time employed on it" (Marx, 1973: 706). Instead, it depends on science and technology and the application of these to production (*ibid.*, 705). This capitalistic production appeared to Marx as the ultimate development of production resting on value. He conceived that direct labour ceases to be the spring of wealth and that labour time ceases to be the main measure. Therefore "exchange value ceases to be the measure of use-value" (*ibid.*, 704-706). Labour cannot be measured by labour time any more, because labour is fractured at numerous points in the variety of activities. Production based on exchange value collapses in the sense that it would be measured by predetermined yardstick.

Searching for this new form of production, capital "calls to life all powers of science and of nature, as of social combination and of social intercourse" (*ibid.*, 706). Capital

tends to create the relation to even insignificant social forces in order to communicate with them and to secure that they are interconnected to each other and to production. When capital appropriates resources through social combination, it reduces multitude to something calculable. But here capital faces a contradiction. In social combination multitude retains potentiality but capital reduces it to something measurable. This rises against capital itself. Capital has itself created material conditions to the instability of the limited foundation of production (*ibid.*, 706).

Nancy and Agamben have taught us that communication is the unworking of work. Perhaps Marx meant something similar when he spoke of general social knowledge (general intellect). He spoke of the development of fixed capital which “indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it” (*ibid.*, 706). If this general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, then wealth is measured by the development of the productive power of all individuals. Direct labour ceases to be the basis of production as “the combination of social activity appears as the producer” (Marx, 1973: 709).

In another context Marx continues to say that the development of all human powers is ‘real’ wealth.

In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity’s own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? (1973: 488)

In the limited bourgeois economy human development appears as “a complete emptying-out”. Human being is totally alienated in universal objectification (*ibid.*, 488).

According to Agamben, communication is the material experience of being-generic. For him, this is the experience of general intellect: “The first consequence deriving from this experiment is the subverting of the false alternative between ends and means that paralyzes any ethics and any politics” (2000: 116). An end without means “is just as alienating as a mediality that makes sense only with respect to an end” (*ibid.*, 116). But in addition, there is the second consequence: “Above and beyond the concepts of appropriation and expropriation, we need to think, rather, the possibility and the modalities of a free use” (*ibid.*, 117). So, perhaps Agamben means that general intellect prepares the understanding of means and *Ereignis* (appropriation and expropriation) which make visible the previously concealed question. These concepts indicate more clearly how capitalistic production is exposed to rupture.

The last phase of capitalism doesn’t imply the simple end of capitalism. Its capability to widen its limits is infinite. Instead, in the last phase capitalism attains its extreme

manner. Being extreme is now the condition of capitalistic production⁵ like the state of exception is the presupposition of juridical reference (Agamben, 1998: 21). If this exception is permanent, then capital faces the fact that its struggle to combine social forces is unfinished. Capital tends to appropriate the potentiality of multitude, but in the end it is incapable of doing so. Therefore, the ultimate development of capitalism appears as the end because this struggle is unfinished in the structure of impossible intertwining. Capital is in the middle of ongoing exceptions.⁶

Did Marx grasp the third form of economy with the experience of general intellect? We can try to find the preliminary answer to this question in Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism'. Writing about homelessness of modern human beings, Heidegger stated that the estrangement of the human being has its roots in this homelessness. If we think homelessness as 'the destiny of the world', "Marx by experiencing estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts" (1998b: 259). The essence of materialism is "in a metaphysical determination according to which every being appears as the material of labour" (*ibid.*, 259). The labour is "the self-establishing process of unconditioned production, which is the objectification of the actual through the human being, experienced as subjectivity" (*ibid.*, 259). For Heidegger, materialism is concealed in technology.

Now, we need to call to mind the forms of economy. In the first form direct labour is measured by labour time. Multitude is reduced to a limited bourgeois form. This means that multitude is analyzed as measurable, actualized, done. The second form appears as the social combination in which general intellect names the multitude. If one understands multitude this way, then one grasps multitude which never loses the character of a possibility. Whereas wealth is based on measurable acts in the first form, in the second form wealth is "the development of all human powers as such" (Marx 1973: 488). In the second form capital discovers, organizes and sets multitude to be a resource. Capital insists that all powers must be transposed into its powers by all the means of art and science. It doesn't accept the multitude in the limited bourgeois form. But in doing so capital would accept the limit for its own extension. Therefore, capital insists that multitude is capable of putting all potentiality into service.

Marx outlined the coming form of economy with the notion of general intellect. What might that form be? Perhaps one experiences this form in Heidegger's (1977a,b) *Ereignis*, Derrida's (1997) gift, Nancy's (1991) 'compearance' and Agamben's (2000) means. They are related to economy, which is circle, organization or technology. But although they are related to economy, they are never part of it. They are not measurable, but in a singular way they disturb economy, like *Ereignis* relates to technology even if it is never part of it. *Ereignis* is the 'lighting' of Being, which can produce rupture in

5 These two citations describe the way of capitalism as being in the manner of extreme: "How much flexibility there is in the axiomatic of capitalism, always ready to widen its own limits so as to add a new axiom to a previously saturated system!" "...on the differential relation of flows having no assignable exterior limit, and where capitalism reproduces its immanent limits on an ever widening and more comprehensive scale (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 238-239).

6 This can be deliberated through Nancy's (1991) thinking of community, which indicates that what is shared in the community is the unworking of works.

economy. In the same way gift disturbs the circle of economy, even if it won't be part of that. Likewise, in a community 'compearance' of beings takes place before any organization and produces rupture in organization. And finally, means contain potentiality and leave something not to be actualized. So, it seems that Marx, Heidegger, Derrida, Nancy and Agamben share the notion of the third form of economy. What I mean is something that Agamben has also noted. For him, "the new categories of political thought" (2000: 116-117) – e.g. 'compearance' or whatever singularity – have the potentiality to express the essential political problem.

Now, one understands that the third form of economy goes beyond the first two forms. Perhaps Marx realized this: Perhaps the experience of communication which is located in the second form could be the starting point to think the third form. But what rises from the premises of the second form (or technology) is *Ereignis*, while the thought of Marx remains half-finished. Heidegger (1977b: 2002) conceived that Being and man belong together and that it is in this combination that *Ereignis* can be perceived. This combination in which Being and man belong together is crucial for understanding *Ereignis* and this will prove to be the border between the second and the third form.

General intellect gives the starting point to outline the third form of economy. And the analysis of post-fordist production has taken this coming form seriously. It describes substantially how contemporary economy appears. Especially Virno (1996, 2004) and Lazzarato (1996) have worked with this analysis. What is important in post-fordist production, is not professional qualifications inside the factory and office but rather socialization that has its centre of gravity outside of the workplace. Through socialization human beings are connected to everything. They are always attainable and ready for every chance. Nothing important is ignored – and everything seems to be. Human beings confront a flux of interchangeable possibilities, keeping open as many as possible. But they don't know what to face in continuous change of contexts. Therefore, they confront continuous uncertainty (Virno, 1996: 14-18).

In the production process nothing unites human beings, but everything unites them regarding the form and content of socialization. When the 'work society' reaches its end, free time and full development of individual will increase and workers are thrown beside actual production. The criteria of productivity is derived now from the experience of non-work. This means that the general requirements for social communication will be in the very centre of analysis. And general intellect will set these requirements. General intellect won't produce commensurability of products, jobs and subjects like money does, but it rather destroys this commensurability: Models of social knowledge do not equate the various activities of labour, but rather present themselves as the 'immediate forces of production'. This abstract knowledge organizes social relations in production (Virno, 1996: 18-25).

The experience of work, production and social communication opens to us 'a possible world' in which all kinds of social activities supplant wage labour. In the 'totality of connections' abstract labour arranges possibilities, but not in the sense of exterior finality: Such a totality of connections is itself only a possibility. "A possible world, determined by non-work as activity, is not something that can ever resolve itself in factual reality". Even "completed facts" won't lose their character of a possibility

(Virno, 1996: 25-28). Virno (2004) deals with the 'possible world', which appears through the work of the multitude. He articulates the ultimate development of capitalism more precisely and outlines the coming economy, i.e. the third form. In this sense Virno steps forward from general intellect. But the 'possible world' and multitude are not the adequate analyses of the question with which the gift, 'compearance' and means are concerned with.

These concepts express more precisely the delivered notion of *Ereignis* in which Being and man belong together. They lead our studies more explicitly to that point where studies are materialized as the political problem. This political problem exists only, because these concepts have preliminary made it possible (Agamben, 2000: 116-117).⁷ And the 'possible world' becomes more understandable with the experience of these concepts. For instance, Nancy's (1991:31) community in which communication has the power to unwork the work, has stated the 'possible world' before. So, I think that these concepts are decisive in any analysis of the third form. In order to understand this problem, one needs to think it through technology and *Ereignis*.

Technology

According to Heidegger, technology is nothing technological. It isn't simple empirical findings on technology like machines, tools, governmental systems or what ever belongs to that. First of all, technology is the means to an end and a human activity. Human beings posit ends, gather means together and utilize them for ends. This complex of contrivances is technology. It is instrumental and this instrumentality conditions human beings' relation to technology. Human beings master by instrumentality, for instance some water falls provide electric power under the control of human beings. And "the will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control" (Heidegger, 1977a: 3-6).

If instrumental definition of technology is correct and if one considers the hydroelectric plant in a river as technology, then the essence of technology is understood in a narrow sense. This technological fixing doesn't need to uncover the essence of technology (Heidegger, 1977a: 6). To uncover this essence does eventually mean that this instrumentality contains potentiality, like Agamben (2000) has said. But what else is technology than means? It is instrumentality when something which is not yet present arrives into the present. One considers carefully (*legein*) what to bring forward into appearance.⁸ This is *poiesis*, bringing-forth, which is revealing something. If instrumentality is the fundamental character of technology and technology is means to ends, then we speak of revealing. "The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing" (*ibid.*, 12). When something is revealed it arrives at the sphere of economical calculation. Therefore, technology isn't mere means, but most of all a way of revealing. Even modern technology is a revealing, but not in the sense of *poiesis*. The

7 Agamben mentioned general intellect, 'compearance' and *Ereignis* in this context.

8 To consider carefully *legein* is rooted in *apophainesthai*.

revealing in modern technology is a challenge which demands that nature supplies energy that can be extracted and stored (*ibid.*, 6-15).

When the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, it is transformed, stored and distributed. These are all ways of revealing. Like social combination the revealing never comes to an end, because revealing reveals its own manifold interlocking paths which need to be regulated and secured. And human beings – who are claimed by a way of revealing that challenges them – approach nature as an object of research. Everything which now presences is worked on by the challenging revealing. Everything becomes a standing-reserve. But human beings never become mere standing-reserves, for they push technology forward and take part ‘in ordering as a way of revealing’. However, technology as an ordering revealing is never mere human handiwork. The essence of technology, enframing (*Ge-stell*),⁹ is the challenging demand to reveal. Enframing is “gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve” (Heidegger, 1977a: 16-20). Therefore, enframing is the way of revealing in modern technology.¹⁰

How should we understand this enframing? According to Heidegger, modern technology is identical with modern metaphysics (1977c: 116). Heidegger stated that in the modern era the world becomes a picture which is the same event as event of man’s becoming *subiectum* (1977c: 132). These events indicate together that “the world stands at man’s disposal as conquered” (1977c: 133). “What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth” (1977c: 129-130). So, this means that human beings become subjects and set up beings in their representedness. Now Being appears through enframing.

The challenging enframing is a danger as such. It is the danger that all what presences and human beings themselves are only a standing-reserve. It banishes human beings into an ordering. This ordering throws away the other ways of revealing (Heidegger, 1977a: 26-27). If technology appears as danger, there is the ‘saving of power’ too. To clarify this sentence, Heidegger studied the essence of technology. What is decisive concerning the essence of technology is to grant it permanently. Heidegger said that “only what is granted endures. That which endures primally out of the earliest beginning is what grants”. Even if enframing sets upon human beings and puts them to reveal the real in the mode of ordering, one can experience through granting that revealed is not mere human handiwork. And granting the essence of technology prepares the rupture of technology. One can say that the essence of technology is ambiguous (cf. Radloff, 1989). Enframing challenges forth into ordering and closes every other way of revealing and therefore endangers the relation between Being and human beings. But now enframing comes to pass in the granting which lets human beings endure. “The arising of the saving power appears” (Heidegger, 1977a: 31-33).

9 Frame, ‘*Gestell*’, is more real than atomic energy, system of machinery, organization, communication and automation (Heidegger, 2002: 35).

10 “In the frame we witness a belonging together of man and Being in which the letting belong first determines the manner of the ‘together’ and its unity” (Heidegger, 2002: 38).

What is now the event which surmounts technology? This event comes to pass when enframing comes to pass in granting. Through granting human beings are opened to Being. In granting technology is not the oblivion of Being any more. "When the danger is as the danger, with the turning about of oblivion, the safekeeping of Being comes to pass; world comes to pass" (Heidegger, 1977b: 43). This turning happens suddenly and unexpectedly. In this event in-flashing comes to pass into enframing. According to Heidegger, in-flashing of the truth of Being comes into truthless Being: "In-flashing is the disclosing coming-to-pass within Being itself. Disclosing coming-to-pass (*Ereignis*) is bringing to sight that brings into its own" (1977b: 41, 43-45).

Surmounting of technology presupposes this disclosing event which is not logically or historiographically predicted, or metaphysically construed. It comes to pass suddenly and it's definitely not the work of a subject. But human beings are needed for the surmounting of technology. When human beings are open to technology, they realize the claim of enframing, but at the same time they become aware of possibilities. What is it that human beings are claimed to be a part of this? Studying enframing is to prepare the appearance of *Ereignis*. Even if this event is not predicted, one needs to deliberate it. This makes possible to think what is the appearance of *Ereignis* (Heidegger, 1977b: 37-41).

Ereignis indicates clearly how it produces the rupture in technology. But more important than to speak of the rupture is to think what produces the rupture as a whole and what is the relation of human beings to it? This means that one understands *Ereignis* and moves forward from this notion. In the third form of economy the important question is not the rupture or *Ereignis* itself but the singular event (like the gift and 'compearance'), which is at one with human beings and which is the matter of thinking. *Ereignis* indicates how Being and human beings belong together (Heidegger, 2002). But *Ereignis* alone remains an empty word if one can't think how it strives for a human activity.¹¹ When Being and human beings belong together then human beings are not at the mercy of rupture but are prepared for the appearance of rupture. If one perceives the rupture, then one should think of what it means for a human activity.

Like Heidegger, Benjamin (1972) wrote that it is important to perceive this kind of event and to prepare for it. According to Benjamin, the recognition of the past does not mean how things really have been. It means that one remembers the past as such as it flashes out in the middle of danger. It is important to take the past as such as it suddenly appears to the subject. What did he try to say with these words? Perhaps he noted that one remembers the past in the event which flashes out in danger. Secondly, he meant that the flash comes to pass suddenly. Thirdly, one needs to recognize the event. Fourthly, one has to think what are the consequences of this recognition – otherwise this recognition is not enough. Fifthly, the event which comes to pass suddenly, as the flash in danger, is not the work of a subject, but appears to subject. This means that human beings are thrown into the world by this event and the same time they are called to prepare for this event, to recognize it and to think how to strive a human activity.

11 For Negri (2003), *kairos* produces subjectivity. But this is not enough unless it leads to the meaningful human activity.

Agamben states the same question by asking, “how does one use a common?” (2000: 117). He addressed that it is unsatisfactory that “the idea of an *Ereignis*, of an ultimate event in which what is seized and delivered from historical destiny is the being-hidden itself of the historical principle” (2000: 111). Therefore Agamben meant that, instead of appropriation and expropriation,¹² we have to think the possibility of a free use. That would be something like the appropriation of an expropriation. That is, we no longer stress the dialectic of proper and improper “in which either the improper extends its own rule everywhere, thanks to an unrestrainable will to falsification and consumption (as it happens in industrialized democracies), or the proper demands the exclusion of any impropriety (as it happens in integralist and totalitarian states)” (Agamben, 2000: 117). Agamben calls this place of indifference between the proper and the improper ‘the common’, comprehended only as use. It is in this sense that the essential political problem is ‘how does one use a common?’

To summarize, communication is the decisive factor what separates the second form from the first one. In the second form communication has entered into production. This experience of communication is important when we outline the third form. What is still concealed in the second form, is made visible in the third one. In the third form we make visible the problem in which Being and human beings belong together. This is the heart of thinking if we try to reach the essential problem of economy: what is the appearance of Being and what is human activity with it? Heidegger made this visible and Agamben continued to the point where we may now ask: ‘how does one use a common?’

We shouldn’t forget Negri (2003) who grasped the multitude and understood the relation between Being (*kairos*) and subjectivity. Multitude isn’t measurable like in the first form, nor characterized as simple potentiality which is set as a resource like in the second form. In the third form the multitude appears where Being and human beings belong together and where this relation is a matter of thinking. Now multitude isn’t simple or mysterious potentiality. No longer we simply think that multitude can do something. Only then we may reach the experience of multitude, which works in the third form of economy.

The Third Form of Economy

Despite the definitions of multitude, one needs to think that multitude intends to achieve an end, i.e. profit or something earned in economy.¹³ Multitude is still measurable (at least in the perception of capital). But this intentionality doesn’t necessarily serve as a means towards an end. Perhaps we could grasp this like Derrida (1997) did. He wrote that something infects the intentional act which misses its end and disturbs economy.

12 Derrida has deliberated the constellation of appropriation and expropriation. He conditions the question of Being and *Ereignis* otherwise, one by the other, one with the other: “Being – which is not, which does not exist as being-present – is signaled on the basis of the gift” (1997: 134).

13 See Heidegger (1977a) and Agamben (2000).

This is the event of the gift, which indicates that Being has a relation to economy. The gift “seeks its place before any relation to the subject” (p.137).

Intentionality is a production which takes place in economy. Agamben (1999a: 186) talked about the problem of intentionality and referred to Heidegger’s (1998a: 63-81) last Marburg lectures. These lectures clarify how intentional relations between subject and object are diverse. The intentional act of subject doesn’t necessarily achieve a certain end. For Heidegger, this relation is not so original than Being-in-the-world by which *Dasein* opens itself to the world before all knowledge and subjectivity. Before this constitution of subject and object, “*Dasein* is already open to the world”: “Knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world” (Heidegger, 1996: 57). We must understand intentionality on this ground.

Agamben has already set this path of *intentionality – facticity – Dasein*. What is facticity? Facticity is something restless and the fact that *Dasein* is being-in-the-world. “Facticity is not the factuality of the *factum brutum* of something objectively present, but is a characteristic of the being of *Dasein* taken on in existence, although initially thrust aside” (Heidegger, 1996: 127). *Dasein* “is thrown in such a way that it is the there as being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1996: 127). Further, facticity is always connected to non-originality and making. In its openness, facticity remains something concealed. Therefore it is characterized by a constellation of concealment and unconcealment. Facticity is a sort of restlessness in being-in-the-world (Agamben, 1999a: 188-192).

Agamben states that the facticity is such that *Dasein* is sucked into the constellation of authenticity and inauthenticity. Being-in-the-world is so tempting. Even if *Dasein* is in the mode of inauthenticity, it is a question of our potentiality for being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1996: 167). The relation between authenticity and inauthenticity is so intimate, that the “authentic existence is nothing which hovers over entangled everydayness, but is existentially only a modified grasp of everydayness” (Heidegger, 1996: 167). Agamben (1999a: 197) pointed out that authentic existence is nothing else than inauthentic. The proper is to apprehend the improper. This is facticity which is never a simple primacy of the proper.¹⁴

Agamben (1999a: 199-201) thinks the constellation of authenticity and inauthenticity through Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1998b: 241-242). In this text Heidegger spoke of *mögen* (to be able) and potentiality. Agamben stressed that *mögen* has a close relation to primacy of possibility. Here potentiality¹⁵ is primarily passive potentiality (*dynamis tou paskhein*), which has solidarity with active potentiality (*dynamis tou poiein*). All potentiality (*dynamis*) is impotentiality (*adynamia*) and all capacity (*dynamis*) is essentially passivity (*dekhesthai*). This powerlessness defines Being of *Dasein* as such. Passive potentiality and *mögen* is capable not only of potentiality, but capable of its impotentiality. Therefore, for Agamben, this is the most radical experience of possibility in *Dasein*.

14 One could criticize Heidegger by saying that he set the proper above the improper or neglected the categories of idle talk and curiosity. Then, according to Agamben, one would “fail to understand the intention of the analytic of *Dasein*” and “bar access to the thought of the Ereignis” (1999a: 197).

15 Here Agamben referred to Heidegger and Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* 1-3.

Now, we say that the most radical experience of possibility, impotentiality defines the multitude as such. Multitude with intentionality dwells in facticity where authenticity and inauthenticity are intertwined. Thinking about its element and technique “when thinking comes to an end by slipping out of its element” (Heidegger, 1998b: 241) are mixed. Now Agamben (1999a: 202-203) can say that the dialectic between the proper and the improper reaches its end. No longer one appropriates some foreign which becomes proper and illuminates something dark. What is appropriated is not taken to light but to lighting between dark and light. Therefore, *Ereignis* means the end of technology in its strict sense. But it means that *Ereignis* is in the middle of means, instrumentality, technology. For Agamben, it becomes possible to say that *Ereignis* is appropriation of an expropriation: What is appropriated is properly improper. In *Ereignis* facticity is appropriated in its distraction. In economy any acts which are means for an end are in distraction. *Dasein* who is capable of its own incapacity, acts in distraction, and as such surmounts the commensurability of economy.

What do the three forms of economy express? In the first form multitude appears as measurable. In the second form communication has entered into production. Communication shows that the potentiality of multitude is multiplied possible combinations. To the third form one brings the analysis where Being and human beings belong together and where we set the question what we should do now. Heidegger (1977a, b; 2002) made this visible by *Ereignis*. Negri (2003) wrote that the right point of time (*kairos*) produces subjectivity, the multitude. Agamben (1999a) indicated that if one understands that Being and human beings belong together then one would grasp how potentiality is essentially impotentiality. This means that the economy is exposed to impotentiality of multitude.

But we must think what all this means and ask what we should do now?¹⁶ Heidegger (1977b: 40) and Benjamin (1972) suggested this, and Agamben (2000: 117) repeated it. Especially Agamben has worked with this question. It wasn't enough for Agamben that he had shown a possible character of means but he wanted to indicate how we can think the essential political problem through *Ereignis*. Negri (2003: 173) also noted that *kairos* is not enough. It produces the multitude but it doesn't ask what multitude should do or which way human activity takes place. To set up this problem for thinking is the essential political problem, and it is also the problem of the economy in its third form.

references

- Agamben, G. (1998) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Agamben, G. (1999) *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Agamben, G. (1999a) *The Facticity of Passion, in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Agamben, G. (2000) *Means without End: Notes on Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Bataille, G. (1988) *The Accursed Share*. New York: Zone Books.
Benjamin, W. (1972) 'Über den Begriff der Geschichte', *Gesammelte Schriften*, I.2, 693-704. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

16 Derrida (1997) and Nancy (1991) simply seem not so interested in what happens after the gift and 'compearance'. Agamben has made much more effort in this direction.

- Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari. (1989) *Anti-Oedipus*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
- Derrida, J. (1997), 'The time of the king', kirjassa, in *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity*, A. Schrift (ed.). London: Routledge.
- Heidegger, M. (1977a) 'The Question Concerning Technology', in *The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Heidegger, M. (1977b) 'The Turning', in *The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Heidegger, M. (1977c) 'The Age of the World Picture', in *The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Heidegger, M. (1996) *Being and Time*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1998a) 'From the Last Marburg Lecture Course', in *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1998b) 'Letter on 'Humanism'', in *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (2002) *Identity and Difference*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lazzarato, M. (1996) 'Immaterial labour', in P. Virno and M. Hardt (eds.) *Radical Thought in Italy, A Potential Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Marx, K. (1973) *Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*. London: Penguin.
- Negri, A. (2003) *Time for Revolution*. London: Continuum.
- Nancy, J.-L. (1991) *The Inoperative Community*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Radloff, B. (1989) 'Das Gestell and L'écriture: The Discourse of Expropriation', in Heidegger and Derrida, *Heidegger Studies*, vol. 5, 23-46.
- Virno, P. (1996) 'The ambivalence of disenchantment', in P. Virno and M. Hardt (eds.) *Radical Thought in Italy, A Potential Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Virno, P. (2004) *A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life*. New York: Semiotext(e).

the author

Pekka Piironen is a researcher in organization studies at the Helsinki School of Economics. He blends economics, organization studies, philosophy and political thought in his work, which focuses currently on giving economy a chance in a book entitled *Petos* (Deception).
E-mail: pekka.piironen@hkkk.fi